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Abstract: 
In this paper, we are interested in how a pharmaceutical industry manages existing antibiotic 
drugs in the context of bacterial resistance. We consider a model based on an epidemiological 
framework where antibiotic recovery rates, and thus intrinsic qualities, may differ. Antibiotic 
efficacy is modeled as a common pool of a non-renewable resource to which antibiotic 
producers have open access. The paper derives antibiotic demands within a vertical 
differentiation model and characterizes the dynamics of infected individuals, antibiotic efficacy 
and treatment rates under the open-access and the socially optimal allocation. We show that 
the high-quality antibiotic drug loses its comparative advantage over time under both 
allocations, such that the low-quality drug should be used longer. This occurs at a later point of 
time in the social optimum and allows for a better control of infection in the longer run. In 
contrast with the ambiguous outcome reported in the literature, the socially optimal steady-
state level of antibiotic efficacy is lower than that of the open-access allocation. We also extend 
our analysis to a strategic, duopolistic context. 
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1 Introduction
There is a growing scientific consensus that antibiotic use to cure infectious diseases causes
the rise of resistant bacteria. The main driving mechanism is that of “natural selection.”
As bacteria get in contact with an antibiotic drug, only susceptible bacteria die, while nat-
urally resistant ones may survive. Bacterial resistance entails economic costs and may have
severe consequences for public health (see for instance, Holmberg et al., 1987; Phelps, 1989;
Gersovitz and Hammer, 2004; Extending the Cure, 2011). In order to mitigate the cost of
bacterial resistance, understanding the market allocation of antibiotic use and its potential
distortions becomes crucial.
The purpose of this paper is to examine how bacterial resistance with respect to a class of
antibiotics evolves, when there is open access on behalf of antibiotic producers to the common
pool of antibiotic efficacy. We compare the market allocation with the socially optimal use of
antibiotics. To do this, we incorporate an economic dimension into an epidemiological model
of resistance introduced by Laxminarayan and Brown (2001) and Bonhoeffer et al. (1997),
which allows to address the evolution of bacterial resistance, infection, and endogenous
substitution between antibiotics. While antibiotics differ with respect to the additional
recovery they procure to the infected individuals (their intrinsic quality), we assume that
all antibiotics are linked to a common pool of treatment efficacy, which can be modelled as
a non-renewable resource (see, Coates et al., 2011).1 The market allocation resulting from
firms having open access to the common resource pool and infected individuals substituting
between antibiotics raises a number of research questions. How does the firms’ behavior
within a pharmaceutical industry affect antibiotic use and treatment efficacy over time?
What is the socially optimal order of use of antibiotics? Can firms’ output decisions sustain
the socially optimal use of antibiotics?
In order to address these questions, we first characterize the open-access market allocation
1As an example, the penicillin class comprises a multitude of antibiotics. The treatment effectiveness of
this class to fight several infections has been decreasing in recent years, which we model here as the decrease
of a valuable bio-economic resource.
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of antibiotics which results from firms entering the market as long as there is a positive rent.
Our results indicate that when two drugs are in use, the fraction of individuals buying the
high-quality antibiotic tends to decline, while the fraction of those buying the low-quality
antibiotic tends to rise. This result can be attributed to the fact that as the overall antibiotic
treatment efficacy decreases, antibiotic demand of the high-quality drug shifts down and the
high-quality drug loses its comparative advantage from a consumer’s point of view. When
the low quality drug’s ratio of additional recovery rate per unit cost is relatively lower as
compared to the high quality one, the low quality drug is dominated and should never be
produced.
We also look at the socially optimal use of antibiotics. Our analysis suggests that when
antibiotic quality per unit cost of production is greater for the high-quality drug, the low-
quality one is dominated and should never be used as in the open-access allocation. We
find that inter-temporal antibiotic use is such that the socially optimal steady-state level
of antibiotic efficacy is lower than that of the open-access case. When both antibiotics are
initially used, the critical level of economic viability of the high quality antibiotic is reached
first such that the exploitation of the low-quality antibiotic lasts longer within both, the open-
access and socially optimal outcome. Numerical simulations indicate that the prevalence of
infection remains lower in the long run in the social optimum, where a more intensive use of
antibiotics is made as compared to the open access.
Our paper fits in the literature developed by natural resource economists who have mod-
elled antibiotic efficacy as a natural resource, which may be — depending on the epidemiolog-
ical specification — renewable or non-renewable. A remarkable contribution is the seminal
paper by Laxminarayan and Brown (2001), which examines the optimal use of two antibi-
otics, each having its own, seperate, pool of antibiotic efficacy. Considering antibiotic efficacy
as a non-renewable resource, they find, among other things, that when unit costs of produc-
tion are equal, it may exist an initial phase where only one antibiotic is used. This regime
prevails up to a point of time where the antibiotic efficacy levels are equal. After that,
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it becomes efficient to use both antibiotics simultaneously. Our approach differs from that
of Laxminarayan and Brown (2001) in three ways. First, these authors abstract from the
individuals’ behavior, and thus antibiotic demand in their analysis, which allows them to
analyze the socially optimal use only. In contrast, this paper deals with a continuum of
individuals choosing between two antibiotics, each individual having a different valuation of
being in good health. We endogenously derive antibiotic demand for each antibiotic drug.
Second, in contrast to the former study, antibiotics’ recovery rates may differ in this paper.
Finally, in addition to the socially optimal use of antibiotics examined by these authors, this
paper asks as in Herrmann and Gaudet (2009) if the equilibrium outcome of firms produc-
ing antibiotics under open access may be socially optimal. Herrmann and Gaudet (2009)
find that, when antibiotic efficacy is renewable, firms producing an antibiotic generate a
steady-state level of antibiotic efficacy, which depending on parameter configurations, may
be greater or lower than its socially-optimal level. Other interesting contributions examine
the use of drugs produced by a monopolist in various contexts. Mechoulan (2007) finds that
while it may be socially optimal to eradicate the disease, it is not profit-maximizing for the
monopolist to do so because infection represents its market size. Herrmann (2010) shows
that when the monopolist faces a finite patent life, his price dynamic is similar to that of
a myopic monopolist as the end of the patent approaches. Our model generalizes the three
contributions mentioned before to the case where substitution between two antibiotics of
different intrinsic quality is possible.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the biological
and economic model. Section 3 examines antibiotic use under open access. Section 4 focuses
on the socially optimal use of antibiotics. Section 5 contrasts the equilibrium trajectories
obtained under open access with the socially optimal outcome. Section 6 presents an exten-
sion of the basic model, where strategic effects are considered in a duopolistic setting. We
conclude in Section 7.
3
2 The bio-economic model
We start by presenting the epidemiological constraints which will later be combined with an
economic model of antibiotic use.
2.1 The SIS model
This section adapts an SIS epidemiological model to examine the use of two antibiotics i =
1, 2. We assume that the total population N is constant and consists of healthy individuals
S(t), who are susceptible to infection and individuals who are infected I(t). An infected
individual is susceptible to either antibiotic treatment or resistant to both, which allows us
to concentrate on the substitution occurring between antibiotics for the treatment of a given
infection. The infected population is thus constituted of individuals who are infected with
a drug-susceptible strain, Iw(t), and those infected with a drug resistant strain, Ir(t). It
follows that, at any instant t, I(t) = Iw(t) + Ir(t) = N − S(t).
Infected individuals can infect the healthy population through contact with them. Let
β represent the transmission rate of each type of infection such that βS(t)(Iw(t) + Ir(t)) =
βS(t)I(t) is the total number of individuals becoming infected at time t. The infected
individuals may recover naturally. However, this may occur at different rates. While the
natural rate of recovery is rr for those infected with the drug-resistant strain, the natural rate
of recovery for those infected with the drug-susceptible strain is rw. In the epidemiological
literature, the difference ∆r = rr − rw is referred to as the fitness cost associated to the
resistant strains and is generally assumed to be positive. The knowledge of the some bacteria
to resist antibiotic treatment comes at the cost that they survive at a lower rate (i.e., lower
fitness) when no antibiotic is used (an individual naturally recovers at a higher rate when
infected with a resistant strain). Additional recovery due to antibiotic treatment occurs only
when the individual is infected with a drug-susceptible strain. Treatment with antibiotic
i then implies an increase in the recovery rate to rw + ri, while the recovery rate remains
at its natural level, rr, for individuals suffering from a drug-resistant strain. We assume
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without loss of generality that antibiotic 1 has a relatively high recovery rate as compared
to antibiotics 2, r1 > r2, i.e. antibiotic 1 is of higher quality than antibiotic 2.
Denote by fi ∈ [0, 1] the fraction of the infected population that is being treated with
antibiotic i. Recovery from the drug-susceptible infection is given by rw + f1r1 + f2r2, such
that the total infected population decreases at the rate rrIr(t)+(rw+f1r1+f2r2)Iw(t). The
population dynamics are then given by
S˙ = −I˙ = −I˙r − I˙w, (1)
I˙w = (βS − rw − f1r1 − f2r2)Iw, (2)
I˙r = (βS − rr)Ir. (3)
As in Laxminarayan and Brown (2001) and Herrmann and Gaudet (2009), we define w =
Iw/I as the level of antibiotic efficacy. Making use of the definition of antibiotic efficacy,
these equations can be transformed to
w˙ = w(1− w)(∆r − f1r1 − f2r2), (4)
I˙ = (β(N − I)− rr)I + wI(∆r − f1r1 − f2r2). (5)
Note that increasing marginally the treatment rate of antibiotic 1, f1, slows down more
intensively the possible regeneration of antibiotic efficacy, while it improves the control of
infection, as compared to the treatment rate of antibiotic 2. Antibiotic 1 thus exerts a
relatively higher selection pressure on drug-susceptible infection.
The dynamic system given by (4) and (5) suggests the existence of three possible steady
states. First, for a particular combination of treatment rates, such that ∆r = f1r1 + f2r2,
antibiotic efficacy remains constant at a level wˆ ∈ [0, 1]. This results in the steady state
(IS, wS) = (N − rr/β, wˆ). (6)
If ∆r 6= f1r1 + f2r2, there are two other steady states associated to the efficacy levels w = 0
and w = 1, which are (
IS, wS) = (N − rr/β, 0
)
(7)
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and
(IS, wS) = ([Nβ − rw − f1r1 − f2r2]/β, 1) . (8)
2.2 Endogenous demands of antibiotics
Let θ denote an individual’s valuation to be in good health, with θ being distributed according
to the distribution function F (θ) over the total populationN . When infected, each individual
decides whether or not to purchase the antibiotic i at price pi. We assume that an individual
cannot be treated simultaneously with the two antibiotics and that the infected individual
does not know from which type of infection (resistant or susceptible) he is suffering, but
knows the level of antibiotic efficacy, w. It follows that the infected individual attributes
probability Ir
I
= 1 − w of being infected with the resistant strain, implying a recovery rate
rr whether he consumes an antibiotic or not. Furthermore, there is a probability
Iw
I
= w
of being infected with the drug-susceptible strain. In the latter situation, if he does not
take any antibiotic, he can expect to recover naturally at the rate rw. The expected natural
recovery rate of an individual without any antibiotic treatment is then given by
pi(w) = (1− w)rr + wrw.
Taking an antibiotic increases the chance of recovery of the individuals who are suffering
from the drug-susceptible strain. Since there is a probability w that the bacterial strain is
susceptible, the additional expected recovery rate of an individual is given by wri when he
takes antibiotic i.
We write the following gross expect utility function for an individual of type θ
v(θ) =


θ if in good health;
pi(w)θ if infected and not taking any antibiotic ;
[pi(w) + riw]θ if infected and taking antibiotic i.
(9)
This is a model of vertical differentiation (Tirole, 1989). Since antibiotic 2 is of low quality as
compared to antibiotic 1, it will never be purchased if it is sold at the same price or is more
expensive than antibiotic 1. Hence, at the equilibrium, we will necessarily have p1 > p2.
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Denote by θ˜12 the infected individual who is indifferent between buying either antibiotic 1 or
antibiotic 2 and θ˜i the individual who is indifferent between buying antibiotic i and nothing
at all when infected. The value of θ˜12 is the solution of the equation
[pi(w) + r1w]θ12 − p1 = [pi(w) + r2w]θ12 − p2,
from which we obtain
θ˜12 =
p1 − p2
w∆rf
. (10)
where ∆rf = r1 − r2 > 0 is the differential of additional recovery rates. The value of θ˜i
satisfies pi(w)θ˜i = [pi(w) + r2w]θ˜i − pi, and hence
θ˜i = pi/wri, i = 1, 2. (11)
First, assume that r1/p1 ≥ r2/p2 (that is, the “antibiotic grade per dollar” for antibiotic 1 is
greater). In this case we have θ˜2 ≥ θ˜1 so that individuals with θ ∈ [θ˜1, θ˜2] will buy antibiotic
1 while individuals with θ ≥ θ˜2 will buy either antibiotic 1 or antibiotic 2. However, as
shown in the appendix, individuals with θ ≥ θ˜2 always prefer antibiotic 1 to antibiotic 2
so that antibiotic 2 is not purchased. Hence, all infected individuals with θ ≥ θ˜1 buy only
antibiotic 1. The fraction of infected individuals who are willing to buy antibiotic 2 is equal
to zero while [1 − F (θ˜1)] represents the fraction of those who are willing to buy antibiotic
1. Since individual demand is unitary, the total demand for antibiotic 1 in this case is
Q1 = I[1− F (θ˜1)].
The more interesting situation occurs when antibiotic 2 is not “dominated”: r2/p2 >
r1/p1. In this case, while individuals with θ ≥ θ˜12 will buy antibiotic 1, those with θ ∈ [θ˜2, θ˜12]
will buy antibiotic 2 and the remaining individuals will not buy any of the two antibiotics.
The fraction of infected individuals who are willing to buy antibiotic 2 is [F (θ˜12) − F (θ˜2)],
whereas the proportion [1 − F (θ˜12)] of individuals is willing to buy antibiotic 1. Since
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individual demand is unitary, the total demand for antibiotics 1 and 2 are respectively
Q1 = I[1− F (θ˜12)] and
Q2 = I[F (θ˜12)− F (θ˜2)],
where I is the potential market size for treatment with antibiotic i.
As in Herrmann and Gaudet (2009) and Herrmann (2010), in the present paper, we re-
strict attention to a uniform distribution of θ across the population with support [0, 1].
Having assumed unitary demand, the quantity fi = Qi/I is the fraction of infected individ-
uals treated with antibiotic i. Thus, when antibiotic 2 is not “dominated” (r2/p2 > r1/p1),
inverse demand functions for antibiotics can be rewritten in terms of f1 and f2 as
p1(f1, f2) = w[r1(1− f1)− r2f2], (12)
p2(f1, f2) = wr2[1− f1 − f2]. (13)
Notice that these inverse demand functions are linear in the treatment fraction, and that
a variation in antibiotic efficacy makes them pivot around the point where price is zero.
Furthermore, for a given value of f2 ∈ [0, 1), w(r1 − r2f2) is the antibiotic 1 choke price,
which is the price at which its demand falls to zero. Likewise, for a given value of f1 ∈ [0, 1),
the choke price for the antibiotic 2 is wr2(1 − f1). If the quality of the two drugs is equal
to zero (w = 0), so will be the price (p1 = p2 = 0) individuals are willing to pay such that
demand is zero (f1 = f2 = 0). However, when antibiotic 2 is dominated (i.e. r1/p1 ≥ r2/p2)
we always have f2 = 0, and the inverse demand for antibiotic 1 in terms of f1 is:
2
p1(f1) = wr1(1− f1). (14)
In this study, as in Laxminarayan and Brown (2001), we will restrict our attention to
situations where the fitness cost is equal to zero (i.e. rr = rw = r).
3 In such a case (i.e.
2Notice that the inverse demands associated to the case where antibiotic 2 is dominated are merely the
restriction of (12) and (13) to f2 = 0.
3 Certain bacteria can be virulent without losing their of resistance (see for instance Bjo¨rkman et al.,
1998).
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∆r = 0), laws of motion (4) and (5) become:
w˙ = −w(1− w)(f1r1 + f2r2), (15)
I˙ = (β(N − I)− r)I − wI(f1r1 + f2r2), (16)
Furthermore, let Ci(Qi) = ciQi denote the cost associated to the production of Qi units
of antibiotic i by a firm, where ci > 0 is the unit production cost of antibiotic i.
3 Antibiotic use under open access
In this section, we assume that firms operating in the industry have open access to the com-
mon pool of antibiotic efficacy. This represents a benchmark analysis of a generic industry,
in which the biological formulae of antibiotics are common knowledge and antibiotics are
produced in a competitive environment. Antibiotic producers will enter until the economic
rent gets dissipated in each market. Hence, at the open-access equilibrium, we must have
[pi − ci]fi = 0, 0 ≤ fi ≤ 1 and pi ≤ ci, i = 1, 2. (17)
In order to derive the open-access equilibrium, it is helpful to distinguish two cases
depending on the relative magnitude of the unit cost as compared to recovery rates. Consider
first the case where r2/c2 > r1/c1. That is, antibiotic quality per unit cost is greater for
antibiotic 2. In this situation, condition (17) along with (12) and (13) allow us to derive the
fraction of the infected population that buys antibiotic 1. It is given by
f∞1 (t) =
{
1− c1−c2
w(t)∆rf
if w(t) > c1−c2
∆rf
;
0 otherwise ,
(18)
where the superscript ∞ stands for the open-access equilibrium. Likewise, the fraction of
the infected population treated with antibiotic 2 is:4
f∞2 (t) =


1
w(t)r2∆rf
(r2c1 − r1c2) if w(t) >
c1−c2
∆rf
;
1− c2
w(t)r2
if c2
r2
< w(t) ≤ c1−c2
∆rf
;
0 otherwise .
(19)
4Notice that the inequality (c1− c2)/∆rf > c2/r2 holds if and only if r2/c2 > r1/c1, which is our working
hypothesis here.
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Consider now the case where antibiotic quality per unit cost is greater for antibiotic 1, i.e.
r1/c1 ≥ r2/c2 (or equivalently r2c1 − r1c2 ≤ 0). In this situation, antibiotic 2 is dominated
so that f∞2 (t) = 0 for all t ≥ 0.
5 Using condition (17) along with (14), we get:
f∞1 (t) =
{
1− c1
w(t)r1
if w(t) > c1
r1
;
0 otherwise .
(20)
The above results suggest three main conclusions, which will help us to characterize
the equilibrium trajectories of antibiotic use under open access. First, the firms’ treatment
decisions are independent of the stock of infected individuals (the market size). This result
is intuitive because firms under open access are benevolent (they do not gain any rent from
production). Second, there exists a critical level of antibiotic efficacy, below which no
antibiotic will be produced in the open-access equilibrium. The level of economic viability is
given by min(c1/r1, c2/r2). Third, depending on the current level of antibiotic efficacy and
other model parameters, there exist four possible regimes, denoted by D,F and Ai, i = 1, 2.
In regime D, the two antibiotics are produced simultaneously, in regime F no individual
buys an antibiotic and in regime Ai, only antibiotic i is produced. These findings will help
us to fully characterize the open-access allocation.
3.1 The steady state in open access
The critical level of antibiotic efficacy, given by min(c1/r1, c2/r2), below which antibiotic use
becomes uneconomical suggests the existence of a steady state in the open-access equilibrium.
Setting f∞1 = f
∞
2 = 0 into equation (5) gives I˙ = (β(N − I)− r)I. Solving this equation for
I˙ = 0 yields the steady state for the stock of infected individuals: I∞ = IS. Therefore, the
steady state in the open-access equilibrium is
(fS∞1 , f
S∞
2 , I
∞, w∞) = (0, 0, IS,min(w0, c1/r1, c2/r2)), (21)
where w∞ = w0 in the case where it is never economically viable to use any antibiotic because
its initial level of antibiotic efficacy was insufficient.
5If antibiotic 2 where not dominated at date t, we would have f∞2 (t) > 0. This is not possible. Indeed,
when r2c1 − r1c2 ≤ 0 the interval [
c2
r2
, c1−c2∆rf ] is empty. Hence, (19) indicates that f
∞
2 (t) cannot be positive
in such a case.
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3.2 The equilibrium dynamics under open access
In this section, we charaterize the evolution of the open-access equilibrium up to convergence
to the steady state of the economy. We assume that the initial stock of infected population
is I(0) = I0 ∈ (0, N) and the initial efficacy level is w(0) = w0 ∈ (0, 1). Since w˙(t) ≤ 0 and
w(t) ≥ 0, antibiotic efficacy is decreasing and it has a limit which is its steady state. Also
note that, having assumed r1 > r2, we always have
c1 − c2
∆rf
>
r2c1 − r1c2
r2∆rf
. (22)
As we will show, condition (22) and the particular structure of (18) and (19) suggest the
existence of critical values of the initial efficacy level w0 and other parameter values, which
distinguish four possible cases for the dynamic behavior of the model.
The first case corresponds to the initial efficacy levels w0 > (c1 − c2)/∆rf and r2/c2 >
r1/c1. In this case, (18) and (19) indicate that initially regime D prevails over the interval of
time [0, t1), where t1 represents the length of time over which w(t) lies above (c1 − c2)/∆rf .
Notice that t1 is defined by w(t1) = (c1 − c2)/∆rf and t1 is finite. To see this, note that
over the interval (0, t1), f
∞
1 > 0 and f
∞
2 > 0. Using (18) and (19) along with (15), we get
w˙ = (1− w)(c1 − r1w). Integration yields
w(t) =
−c1(1− w0) + (c1 − r1w0)e
t(c1−r1)
−r1(1− w0) + (c1 − r1w0)et(c1−r1)
, 0 ≤ t ≤ t1. (23)
Now, set h(t) = w(t) − (c1 − c2)/∆rf , which is a continuous function. We have h(0) =
w0− (c1− c2)/∆rf > 0 and limt→+∞ h(t) = c1/r1− (c1− c2)/∆rf < 0.
6 Since w is monotone,
so is h. Therefore, it exists a unique t1 ∈ (0,∞) such that w(t1) = (c1− c2)/∆rf . Equations
(18)-(19) and (22) suggest that at instant t1, regime A2 starts. Suppose that this regime
ends at t2, which is characterized by w(t2) = c2/r2. Recall that in A2, we have f
∞
1 = 0
and f∞2 > 0, the efficacy dynamic is w˙ = −w(1 − w)r2f
∞
2 = −(1 − w)(r2 − c2w), with the
boundary condition w(t1) = (c1− c2)/∆rf . Using a similar reasoning as for regime D, it can
6Since r2c1 − r1c2 > 0, we have
c1
r1
− (c1−c2)∆rf = −
r2c1−r1c2
r1∆rf
< 0. So, the sign of h changes over (0,+∞).
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be shown that A2 has a finite length. Since we have w(t2) = c2/r2, (18) and (19) show that
regime F prevails from t2 forever. Since in regime F , f
∞
1 = f
∞
2 = 0, the level of antibiotic
efficacy remains constant w(t) = c2/r2 for all t ≥ t2. These results are illustrated in Figure
1. As antibiotic efficacy tends to decrease, patients switch from antibiotic 1 to antibiotic
2, which has greater relative grade r2/c2 > r1/c1. This pattern continues until antibiotic
1 becomes not economically viable. After this instant, the fraction of individuals using
antibiotic 2 decreases up to a point where antibiotic efficacy (or quality) becomes very small
leading to non economic viability of antibiotics. These results may be attribute to the fact
that as antibiotic efficacy decreases (or equivalently resistance increases), antibiotic demands
diminish. Moreover, for a given dose, (15) suggests that antibiotic 1 lowers antibiotic efficacy
than antibiotic 2 does.
The second case is for initial efficacy levels (c1−c2)/∆rf ≥ w0 > c2/r2, and r2/c2 > r1/c1.
In this situation, regime A2 prevails initially. Let t3 denote its length, which is characterized
by w(t3) = c2/r2. Since in A2 we have f
∞
1 = 0 and f
∞
2 > 0, (15) indicates that antibiotic
efficacy dynamic is w˙ = −w(1−w)r2f
∞
2 = −(1−w)(r2− c2w), with the boundary condition
w(0) = w0. A similar reasoning as for the first case allows us to see that t3 is finite. Since we
have w(t3) = c2/r2, (18) and (19) suggest that regime F prevails from t3 forever. Recall that
in regime F , we have f∞1 = f
∞
2 = 0 so that w is constant. Therefore, we have w(t) = c2/r2
for all t ≥ t3.
The third case is for w0 > c1/r1 and r1/c1 ≥ r2/c2. Recall that in this case, antibiotic 2
is dominated, which implies (f∞2 = 0). So, (15) and (20) show that the antibiotic efficacy
dynamic is: w˙ = (1−w)(c1−r1w). Using a similar method as for the first case, it can be shown
that antibiotic efficacy approaches its steady-state ws = c1/r1 asymptotically. The fraction
of infected individuals treated with antibiotic 1 decreases and converges asymptotically to a
state where no individual buys antibiotic 1.
The fourth case corresponds to the situation where c1/r1 > c2/r2 ≥ w0 or c2/r2 ≥ c1/r1 ≥
w0. Since antibiotic efficacy cannot replenish, (18), (19) and (20) show that in this case, the
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two antibiotics are not economically viable (f∞1 = f
∞
2 = 0). So, (15) suggests that the level
of antibiotic efficacy remains constant and is equal to its initial value.
Summarizing, the above results suggest four possible orders of use of antibiotics. (i) if
w0 > (c1 − c2)/∆rf and r2/c2 > r1/c1, then the sequence of use is D → A2 → F . (ii) if
(c1 − c2)/∆rf ≥ w0 > c2/r2 and r2/c2 > r1/c1, then the order of use is A2 → F . (iii) if
w0 > c1/r1 and r1/c1 ≥ r2/c2, then regime A1 prevails forever. (iv) if c1/r1 > c2/r2 ≥ w0 or
c2/r2 ≥ c1/r1 ≥ w0, then regime F prevails forever.
Having derived so far the evolution of antibiotic treatment rates and antibiotic efficacy,
we will next show in (I, w)-space, the evolution of antibiotic efficacy as function of the stock
of infected individuals. Since antibiotics are not used in the fourth case described above,
the stock of infected individuals evolves along a horizontal line up to convergence (in the
(I, w)-space). In addition, for f1 = f2 = 0, (16) indicates that I˙ T 0, if and only if I S IS.
Hence, when starting below the biological steady state IS, the stock of infected individual
rises monotonically and converges to IS defined in (6). However, when starting above IS,
the stock of infected individual declines monotonically and converges to IS.
The dynamics of the open-access equilibrium for the first case as described above is
illustrated in space (I, w) in Figure 2.7 When initially located to the left of the isocline
I˙ = 0, the stock of infected individuals rises and converges to the biological steady state
given in (6). However, when initially located to the right of the isocline I˙ = 0, the stock of
infected individuals evolves non-monotonically: it initially falls below its steady-state level,
before it starts to increase again up to convergence to its steady-state level. This pattern
of “undershooting” in the level of infection is caused by epidemiology (see, for instance
Wilen and Msangi, 2003), in particular the underlying assumption on disease transmission.
7 The second and the third case have similar (I, w)-space representation as the first one.
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4 Socially optimal use of antibiotics
This section examines the optimal use of antibiotics 1 and 2. The instantaneous social welfare
is the sum of gross expected surplus of individuals minus production costs. Its expression is
given by
W (f1, f2, w, I) = N
∫ 1
0
v(θ)dθ − (c1f1 + c2f2)I
= (N − I)
∫ 1
0
θdθ + I
∫ θ˜2
0
pi(w)θdθ + I
∫ θ˜12
θ˜2
[(pi(w) + r2w)θ − p2]dθ
+I
∫ 1
θ˜12
[(pi(w) + r1w)θ − p1]dθ + (p1 − c1)f1I + (p2 − c2)f2I.
Integration yields
W (f1, f2, w, I) =
1
2
(N − I) +
1
2
rI + I[
1
2
r2w(θ˜12 + θ˜2)− p2](θ˜12 − θ˜2)
+I[
1
2
r1w(1 + θ˜12)− p1](1− θ˜12) + (p1 − c1)f1I + (p2 − c2)f2I
=
1
2
(N − I) +
1
2
rI +
I
2
r2w(2− 2f1 − f2)f2
+
I
2
r1w(2− f1)f1 − c1f1I − c2f2I, (24)
where the last equality follows by making use of inverse demand functions (12) and (13)
in combination with (10) and (11). In particular, we characterize the critical consumers as
θ˜2 = 1−f1−f2 and θ˜12 = 1−f1. The first term in equation (24) corresponds to the average,
expected surplus of the healthy population, the second one corresponds to the expected
surplus of infected individuals recovering naturally, the third and fourth terms correspond
to the additional expected surplus accruing to infected individuals when buying antibiotic 1
or 2, and the last two terms are the production costs of antibiotics.
The social optimum is determined by treatment paths 0 ≤ f1 ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ f2 ≤ 1
maximizing
∫ +∞
0
e−ρtW (f1(t), f2(t), w(t), I(t))dt, (25)
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subject to (15), (16), w(0) = w0, I(0) = I0, where W (f1, f2, w, I) is defined by (24) and
where ρ is the social discount rate. The Hamiltonian in current value for this optimization
problem is
H =
1
2
(N − I) +
1
2
rI +
I
2
r2w(2− 2f1 − f2)f2 +
I
2
r1w(2− f1)f1
− c1f1I − c2f2I − λ[w(1− w)(f1r1 + f2r2)] + µ[(β(N − I)− r)I − wI(f1r1 + f2r2)],
where λ and µ are costate variables associated to antibiotic efficacy and infection, respec-
tively. As antibiotic efficacy is a desirable resource for society, we conjecture that λ is positive
and reflects the implicit value of antibiotic efficacy. This contrasts with µ, which represents
the implicit cost of infection for society, and should be non-positive.8
Optimality conditions for (25) require for antibiotic i = 1, 2
∂H
∂fi
≤ 0, fi ≥ 0,
∂H
∂fi
fi = 0, or
∂H
∂fi
≥ 0, fi ≤ 1,
∂H
∂fi
(1− fi) = 0, (26)
where
∂H
∂f1
= [w(1− f1)r1 − wf2r2 − c1]I − wr1[λ(1− w) + µI],
∂H
∂f2
= [wr2(1− f1 − f2)− c2]I − wr2[λ(1− w) + µI],
as well as λ˙− ρλ = −
I
2
r2(2− 2f1 − f2)f2 −
I
2
r1(2− f1)f1
+(f1r1 + f2r2)(λ(1− 2w) + µI), (27)
µ˙− ρµ =
(1− r)
2
−
r2
2
w(2− 2f1 − f2)f2 −
r1
2
w(2− f1)f1
+c1f1 + c2f2 − µ[β(N − 2I)− r − w(f1r1 + f2r2)], (28)
lim
t→+∞
e−rtλ(t)w(t) = 0 and lim
t→+∞
e−rtµ(t)I(t) = 0, (29)
Let f ∗1 and f
∗
2 denote the socially optimal treatment rates. For an interior solution, static
efficiency in (26) implies
w(1− f ∗1 )r1 − wr2f
∗
2 = c1 + wr1[
λ
I
(1− w) + µ] ≡ cˆ1, (30)
w(1− f ∗1 − f
∗
2 )r2 = c2 + wr2[
λ
I
(1− w) + µ] ≡ cˆ2. (31)
8Numerical simulations confirm our conjecture as will be shown later.
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where cˆi is defined as the augmented marginal cost of treatment with antibiotic i. The left-
hand sides of (30) and (31) represent antibiotic 1’s and 2’s socially optimal price, respectively.
Hence, conditions (30) and (31) state that when in use, antibiotic i’s price should be equal
to its augmented marginal cost of treatment. Note that the implicit value of antibiotic
efficacy adds to the augmented marginal cost, as antibiotic use involves a negative externality:
current antibiotic use implies forgone efficacy in the future. However, there is also a positive
externality related to antibiotic use as it allows to control for future prevalence of infection,
diminishing the augmented marginal cost of antibiotic treatment.
It can be shown that antibiotic 2 should never be produced when the antibiotic intrinsic
quality per unit cost is greater for antibiotic 1 (i.e. r1/c1 ≥ r2/c2). To see this, dividing (30)
and (31) respectively by r1 and r2 results in two equations, which subtracting side by side
yield
p1
r1
−
p2
r2
=
r2c1 − r1c2
r1r2
,
which is negative as long as r2c1 − r1c2 ≤ 0 (i.e. r1/c1 ≥ r2/c2). This finding implies that
antibiotic 2 is always dominated (r1/p1 ≥ r2/p2 or equivalently f
∗
2 = 0) when r1/c1 ≥ r2/c2.
In particular, antibiotic 2 should never be used when antibiotics have the same unit cost of
production (i.e. c1 = c2).
Notice that, given our specification, antibiotics are in a common pool of antibiotic efficacy.
By contrast, Laxminarayan and Brown (2001) propose a separate pool of antibiotic efficacy.
In the latter, the authors show that when unit costs of production are identical, there may
exist a phase characterized by simultaneous use of the two antibiotics as the socially-optimal
outcome. This does not hold in our context as the low-quality antibiotic is then necessarily
dominated.
4.1 The socially optimal steady state
The socially optimal steady state is defined by µ˙ = λ˙ = w˙ = I˙ = 0. Since w0 ∈ (0, 1) and w
is decreasing, the biological steady state where w = 1 as given in (8) is not sustainable. The
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biological steady state where w = 0 as given in(7) is also unsustainable because treatment
rates must fall to zero form the instant on, where antibiotic efficacy reaches its viability
level, min(w0, cˆ1/r1, cˆ2/r2). Denote by w
s the steady-state level of antibiotic efficacy. We
then have: (i) ws ∈ (0, 1) and (ii) ws is equal to the long run antibiotic efficacy viability
level.
At the steady state, we have w˙ = −w(1 − w)(r1f1 + r2f2) = 0, which implies that
f1 = f2 = 0. Combining these results along with (26)-(29) yields the steady state for shadow
prices: λs = 0 and µs = −(1− r)/2(ρ+Nβ − r). Using the fact that ws is equal to the long
run viability level of antibiotic use, it can be shown that
ws = min
(
w0,
2c1(ρ+Nβ − r)/r1
2(Nβ + ρ− r) + (1− r)
,
2c2(ρ+Nβ − r)/r2
2(Nβ + ρ− r) + (1− r)
)
. (32)
Hence, the steady-state level of the social optimum is
(f s1 , f
s
2 , I
s, ws) = (0, 0, IS, ws), (33)
where ws and IS are defined by (6) and (32), respectively.
Condition (33) suggests that no antibiotic is used in the social optimum when the initial
level of antibiotic efficacy falls below the socially optimal levels of economic viability, in which
case the level of antibiotic efficacy remains constant over time at w0. The more interesting
case arises when at least one antibiotic should be used initially. In such a case, ws < w0
and it can be shown that an increase in the discounted rate ρ or the transmission rate of
infections β tends to increase ws.
4.2 The socially optimal dynamics
Given the complexity of the static and dynamic efficiency conditions (26)-(28), we run numer-
ical simulations in order to address the dynamics of the socially optimal treatment rates, of
antibiotic efficacy and infection, as well as their shadow values. As in Laxminarayan and Brown
(2001), we consider a discrete time version of the model presented above and assume a finite
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horizon T = 100.9 Note that the finite horizon impacts on the dynamics of all variables.
However, for a sufficiently long time horizon, dynamics exhibit the turnpike pattern, which
allows a good characterization of the infinite horizon problem. In particular, we observe nu-
merical convergence to the steady state as defined in (33), while shadow values approach their
steady state levels before satisfying appropriate transversality conditions (λ(T ) = µ(T ) = 0,
see the appendix).
Unless specified differently, we use baseline parameter values ρ = 0.04; c1 = 0.004; c2 =
0.001; r1 = 0.17; r2 = 0.154; r = 0.2; β = 0.7;N = 1;w0 = 0.8 and I0 = 0.8.
10 Treatment
fractions f ∗1 and f
∗
2 are shown in Figure 6 (ignore, for now, the trajectories corresponding
to the open access). Initially, antibiotic 1 should be used more intensively as compared
to antibiotic 2, as is procures a higher additional recovery rate (r1 > r2) to individuals.
As the level of antibiotic efficacy decreases, treatment with antibiotic 1 is reduced, while
treatment with antibiotic 2 is intensified. More importance is given to the antibiotic which
diminishes antibiotic efficacy less and is also less costly. The socially optimal level of economic
viability is reached first for antibiotic 1, and later on for antibiotic 2. When I0 = 0.5 (graph
not shown), more intensive use is made of antibiotics, in particular of antibiotic 1. The
qualitative evolution with respect to the treatment rates is similar.
Higher values of r1 imply a decrease of the critical level of economic viability for antibiotic
1, whereas the one associated with antibiotic 2 tends to rise. While this causes the use of
antibiotic 1 to last longer, it reduces the extraction duration for antibiotic 2. These results
are illustrated in Figure 3.
We also examine the effects of the infection transmission rate on treatment rates. In
response to an increase in β, treatment rates decrease, which leads to a slow depletion of
antibiotic efficacy during an initial phase allowing to sustain a high level of treatment rates
later on. Overall, such an increase of β leads to an intensive exploitation of antibiotic efficacy
9Sufficient conditions for optimality of the discrete time version with a finite horizon of this model are
presented in the appendix.
10Given these parameter values, we have r2/c2 > r1/c1. Our previous analysis hence suggests that antibi-
otic 2 is not dominated.
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as illustrated in Figure 4.
We have also investigated the evolution of the shadow values, µ and λ. In particular,
we find a negative relation between the level of infection and the shadow cost of infection
as shown in Figure 5 for various values of the transmission rate β. Consider the baseline
parameter case with β = 0.7. In the left panel of Figure 5, as infection moves towards
its steady-state level, the shadow cost of infection decreases. At the margin, an additional
infected individual causes less social cost, the smaller the gap between the current and the
unavoidable, steady-state levels of infection. Also note that the higher the transmission
rate of infection, the lower is the social cost of infection. While this result may appear
counterintuitive at first sight, it is due to the fact that the infection can be controlled at a
lesser extent, such that an additional infected individual causes relatively less social cost.
The right panel of Figure 5 shows the evolution of the social cost of infection, whenever the
initial value of infection is relatively high (I0 = 0.8). Its evolution is now non-monotonic,
reflecting the pattern of undershooting below the steady-state level of infection. Notice that
in both panels, the implicit social cost of infection shows the turnpike pattern: it remains
close to its steady-state level, before converging to zero satisfying the transversality condition
µ(T ) = 0.
With respect to the implicit value of antibiotic efficacy, numerical simulations (graph
not shown) suggest a positive relationship between antibiotic efficacy and λ. As the level of
antibiotic efficacy decreases, the inverse demand function pivots inside (antibiotic consump-
tion is less valued), which is reflected by a decreasing implicit value of antibiotic efficacy. In
particular, we also find that the higher the initial level of infection, the higher will be the
implicit value of antibiotic efficacy.
5 Comparing the open-access equilibrium with the social optimum
This section compares in order, the steady state and the trajectories of the open-access
equilibrium with the socially optimal allocation.
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5.1 Comparing steady states
Consider the interesting case in steady states (21) and (33) where w0 is sufficiently high to
warrant antibiotic production in the open-access and socially optimal allocation. It can be
shown by comparing (21) and (33) that the steady-state level of antibiotic efficacy under
open access is always greater than in the social optimum. This occurs, because a more
intensive use of antibiotics must have been made in the social optimum while antibiotics are
used, a point which we address in what follows. The steady-state level of antibiotic efficacy
corresponds to the respective level of economic viability. When w0 lies below the respective
level of economic viability, no antibiotic will be used under both allocations. This implies
that the steady-state antibiotic treatment rates necessarily coincide in the socially optimal
and open-access allocation. Note that this also implies the steady-state levels of infection to
coincide.
5.2 Comparing dynamics
When both drugs are simultaneously used, it can be shown that the socially optimal treat-
ment fraction with antibiotic 2 coincides with the open-access equilibrium at the initial date
t0 = 0 regardless of the parameter values i.e., f
∗
2 (0) = f
∞
2 (0). Indeed, combining (30) and
(31), we can eliminate f ∗1 and obtain: f
∗
2 (0) = (r2cˆ1 − r1cˆ2)/(w0r2∆rf). Substituting for
the augmented marginal cost of antibiotic use yields the desired result. However, treatment
fractions of antibiotic 1 do not coincide under both allocations, i.e. f ∗1 (0) 6= f
∞
1 (0). Since
θ˜12 = 1−f1 and θ˜2 = 1−f1−f2, individuals characterized by θ buying either antibiotic differ
even at the initial date. Furthermore, when c1/r1 > c2/r2, antibiotic 2 is not dominated and
we also have cˆ1/r1 > cˆ2/r2. This result implies that antibiotic 1 always has a higher critical
level of economic viability. In other words, when the two drugs are initially in use, the pro-
duction of antibiotic 1 lasts less than that of antibiotic 2 under both, the open-access and
socially optimal allocation. Numerical simulations confirm the validity of these analytical
results.
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Figure 6 shows the evolution of treatment fractions in the open-access equilibrium and
social optimum when I0 = 0.8, while Figure 7 shows the evolution of the state variables,
(I, w) for initial state I0 = 0.5 and I0 = 0.8. Although the smallest level of infection
prevalence is obtained in the open-access equilibrium, because more intensive use is made of
antibiotics initially as compared to the social optimum, the prevalence of infection is lower
in the long run in the social optimum as can be seen from Figure 8.
The numerical results described here are robust for a large range of parameter values
when both antibiotics are produced initially. After that, only antibiotic 2 is produced. In
particular, both antibiotics tend to be used on a longer time scale in the social optimum as
compared to the open access. It also turns out that the use of both antibiotics tends to be
higher initially under open access, whereas the opposite tends to hold later on as can be seen
in Figure 6.
6 Addressing strategic effects in the pharmaceutical industry
Having modeled antibiotic producers as having open access to the common pool of antibi-
otic efficacy represents an interesting benchmark, particularly for generic producers, as the
biological formulae has become common knowledge. However, this abstracts from strategic
interaction between producers, to which we now turn. In particular, we make the assump-
tion that each antibiotic is produced by a single firm, such that the market consists of a
duopoly. Each firm acts non-myopically in the sense that it takes into account the effects
of its current treatment decision on future levels of antibiotic efficacy and infection. Firm i
chooses the treatment path 0 ≤ fi(t) ≤ 1 that maximizes its discounted profit, considering
as given the treatment strategy of the other firm, j. Current profit of firm i at time t is
given by pii(t) = [pi(f1(t), f2(t))− ci]fi(t)I(t). Taking fj as given, the intertemporal problem
of firm i then becomes
max
0≤fi≤1
∫ +∞
0
e−ρtpii(t)dt, (34)
subject to (15), (16), w(0) = w0 and I(0) = I0.
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The current-value Hamiltonian at date t for optimal control problems (34) are, respec-
tively
Hi = pii − λiw(1− w)(f1r1 + f2r2) + µi[(β(N − I)− rr)I − wI(f1r1 + f2r2)], i = 1, 2,
where λi and µi represent the shadow price associated respectively to the level of antibiotic
efficacy and to the stock of infected population. We have
∂H1
∂f1
= [w(1− 2f1)r1 − wf2r2 − c1]I − wr1[λ1(1− w) + µ1I],
∂H2
∂f2
= [wr2(1− f1 − 2f2)− c2]I − wr2[λ2(1− w) + µ2I].
The optimality conditions for (34) require for i = 1, 2
∂Hi
∂fi
≤ 0, fi ≥ 0,
∂Hi
∂fi
fi = 0, or
∂Hi
∂fi
≥ 0, fi ≤ 1,
∂Hi
∂fi
(1− fi) = 0, (35)
λ˙i − ρλi = −
∂Hi
∂w
, (36)
µ˙i − ρµi = −
∂Hi
∂I
, (37)
lim
t→+∞
e−ρtλi(t)w(t) = 0; lim
t→+∞
e−ρtµi(t)I(t) = 0. (38)
Conditions in (35) represent the static efficiency conditions while (36) and (37) are the arbi-
trage equations, which describe the optimal path for λi(t) and µi(t), respectively. Equations
in (38) are transversality conditions.
For an interior solution, we have 0 < fi < 1, i = 1, 2, so that (35) can be rewritten as:
w(1− 2f1)r1 − wr2f2 = c1 + wr1[
λ1
I
(1− w) + µ1],
w(1− f1 − 2f2)r2 = c2 + wr2[
λ2
I
(1− w) + µ2].
Define c˜i = ci+wri[
λi
I
(1−w)+µi], i = 1, 2 as the augmented marginal cost for firm i. These
conditions then state that it is profit maximizing for each firm to produce at a rate such
that its marginal revenue equals its augmented marginal cost.
Using a similar method as for the social optimum, we derive the steady-state treatment
rates and stock of infected individuals
(fSm1 , f
Sm
2 , I
m) = (0, 0, IS). (39)
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The steady-state level of antibiotic efficacy level is
wm = min
(
w0,
2c1(ρ1 +Nβ − r)
r1(−1 − r + 2(ρ+Nβ))
,
2c2(ρ2 +Nβ − r)
r2(−1− r + 2(ρ+Nβ)
)
. (40)
We assume that ρ+Nβ > (1 + r)/2 in order to warrant the positiveness of the steady-state
level of antibiotic efficacy wm. It can be shown that wm ≥ wo ≥ ws, i.e. the exploitation of
antibiotics by the duopolistic firms leads to a steady-state level of antibiotic efficacy greater
than that obtained under the open-access equilibrium, which in turn is greater than that
of the social optimum. In addition, this order is strict when at least one antibiotic is used
within these approaches.
We have run numerical simulations with parameter values ρ = 0.04; r1 = 0.17; r2 =
0.154;N = 1; β = 0.7; r = 0.2;w0 = 0.8; c1 = c2 = 0.004, and I0 = 0.8. Calculating
the antibiotic quality/price ratio (ri/pi), we have verified that r2/p2 > r1/p1, i.e. that
antibiotic 2 is not dominated in a duopolistic market setting. However, antibiotic 2 would
be dominated if the market were to be served by firms having open access to the common
pool resource of antibiotic efficacy, due to the fact that given the parameters considered, we
have r1/c1 ≥ r2/c2. This result implies that the duopolistic firm 2 adjusts its price in order
for its product not to be dominated. Both antibiotics are produced over the complete time
horizon as can be seen in Figure 9.
Finally, we want to address which market structure is socially more desirable, i.e. repre-
sents a second best outcome. While antibiotic producers having open access cannot account
for any intertemporal effect of their current antibiotic use on antibiotic efficacy and infection,
duopolistic firms can. However, infection represents a desirable resource for duopolistic firms,
which attribute a positive implicit value. Recall that in the social optimum the implicit value
is negative and represents the social cost of infection. We find numerical evidence that the
discounted social welfare as defined in (25) evaluated along the different market equilibria
is lower in the open-access setting as compared to the duopolistic setting when the discount
rate is relatively small.
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7 Conclusion
This paper has addressed the management of antibiotics belonging to a given class of an-
tibiotics used to fight an infection. While antibiotics may have different recovery rates
(intrinsic qualities), they are linked to a common resource pool of antibiotic efficacy, which
is endogenously determined by antibiotic use over time. We model the demand system for
two antibiotics which are substitutes in fighting a given infection. The combination of the
economic model with a biological model of disease transmission allows us to capture the evo-
lution of bacterial resistance (a non-desirable bio-economic resource). While a full dynamic
solution of the open-access equilibrium could be derived, we relied on numerical simulations
to illustrate certain results for the social optimum as analytical solutions were not tractable.
When antibiotic quality per unit cost is greater for the high-quality antibiotic, the low-quality
antibiotic should never be used under both, the open access and social optimum. However,
when at least one antibiotic is initially used, the open access leads to a long-run level of
antibiotic efficacy, which is greater than the socially optimal level. When both antibiotics
are used initially, the level of economic viability of the high quality antibiotic is reached first
such that the exploitation of the low-quality antibiotic lasts longer. In this context, we also
find that the initial treatment rate with the low-quality antibiotic under the open-access
equilibrium is socially optimal.
Our results shed new light on the socially optimal order of use of antibiotics as compared
to Laxminarayan and Brown (2001). When each antibiotic has its own pool of antibiotic
efficacy (separate classes), the findings of these authors suggest that antibiotics may be
produced simultaneously when they have the same unit cost of production. In a common
class however, we have shown analytically the non validity of that result. In particular, our
model suggests that in a common class of antibiotic efficacy, when antibiotic unit production
costs are equal, it is not socially optimal to use the low-quality antibiotic.
We should mention that our findings are obtained under particular assumptions con-
cerning the market structure. Other interesting considerations include a Stackelberg-type
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market structure where a leader produces an antibiotic. After observing his production level,
a follower chooses its treatment path. Furthermore, in many situations, patients have the
possibility to purchase an insurance coverage which may help them buying drugs if they
are infected. Incorporating these features in our model might affect the antibiotics’ prices
and treatment rates and ultimately, the evolution of antibiotic efficacy. How exactly these
features would influence the results is however a matter for future research.
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Appendix
• Proof that antibiotic 2 is dominated when r1/p1 ≥ r2/p2
Assume that r1/p1 ≥ r2/p2.
{[pi(w) + r1w]θ − p1} − {[pi(w) + r2w]θ − p2}
= p1(
θr1w
p1
− 1)− p2(
θr2w
p2
− 1)
≥ (p1 − p2)(
θr2w
p2
− 1),
which is positive if θ ≥ p2/wr2 ≡ θ˜2.
• Discrete time numerical analysis
In a discrete time framework with a finite horizon T , given I0 and w0, optimality condi-
tions for (25) require
∂H
∂f1
≤ 0, f1 ≥ 0,
∂H
∂f1
f1 = 0, or
∂H
∂f1
≥ 0, f1 ≤ 1,
∂H
∂f1
(1− f1) = 0,
∆λ− ρλ = −
I
2
r2(2− 2f1 − f2)f2 −
I
2
r1(2− f1)f1 + (f1r1 + f2r2)(λ(1− 2w) + µI),
∆µ− ρµ =
(1− r)
2
−
r2
2
w(2− 2f1 − f2)f2 −
r1
2
w(2− f1)f1 + c1f1 + c2f2
− µ[β(N − 2I)− r − w(f1r1 + f2r2)],
∆w = −w(1− w)(f1r1 + f2r2),
∆I = [β(N − I)− r − w(f1r1 + f2r2)]I,
λ(T ) = 0; µ(T ) = 0.
where ∆µ(t) = µ(t + 1) − µ(t), ∆w(t) = w(t + 1) − w(t), ∆I(t) = I(t + 1) − I(t) and
∆λ(t) = λ(t+ 1)− λ(t) for t = 0, 1, ...T − 1.
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Figure 1: Treatment rates in open access when w0 > (c1 − c2)/∆rf and r2/c2 > r1/c1.
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Figure 2: Phase diagram representing (I, w)-space in open access.
27
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
time
Tr
ea
tm
en
t r
at
es
 
 
f1
*
 r1=0.4
f2
*
 r1=0.4
f1
*
 r1=0.35
f2
*
 r1=0.35
f1
*
 r1=0.3
f2
*
 r1=0.3
f1
*
 r1=0.2
f2
*
 r1=0.2
f1
*
 r1=0.17
f2
*
 r1=0.17
Figure 3: Effects of varying r1 on the socially-optimal treatment rates
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Figure 4: Effects of varying β on the socially-optimal treatment rates
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Figure 5: Effects of varying β on the evolution of (I,−µ).
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
time
tre
at
m
en
t r
at
es
 
 
f1
*
f2
*
f1
∞
f2
∞
Figure 6: Comparing socially optimal and open-access treatment rates for I0 = 0.8.
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Figure 7: Comparing socially optimal and open-access evolution of (I, w).
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Figure 8: Evolution of the stock of infected individuals and antibiotic efficacy under open
access and social optimum for I0 = 0.8.
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Figure 9: Equilibrium dynamics within the strategic behavior
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